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This paper examines the formation and governance of strategic alliances. In particular, 
the problem is defined for the development of alliances in agriculture, where new 
organizational forms are arising rapidly for horizontal and vertical coordination of the 
production-marketing chain.  As the title of this research conference implies, these 
organizational forms offer opportunities within the portfolio of strategies facing 
agricultural producers for reconfiguring their marketing and managing risks by 
joint/collective action. 
 
The basis for the paper is the resource-based theory (RBT) of firm strategy, which has 
developed over the past ten years as a way to build positive and normative models of 
strategic decisions. The RBT draws from industrial organization economics and 
organizational economics (often called neoinstitutional economics) as a way to model 
the sources and robustness of sustainable competitive advantage. This paper extends 
to RBT to the joint strategies of firms engaged in strategic alliances. 
 
Additionally, the analysis turns on the manner by which economic rents are earned in a 
strategic alliance and how they are shared by alliance partners. What rights do alliance 
partners have to jointly earned returns in the alliance, given its organizational form 
(statutory structure and governance structure), the sources of economic rents, risks 
associated with the rent streams, and the often intangible resources (assets) that drive 
the performance of the joint assets in the alliance?  
 
This discussion paper presents a brief review of the RBT model, followed by a 
discussion of the sources of, and durability of, economic rents that accrue to firm 
resources. These sections are essentially résumés of the current literature on RBT. The 
third section departs from the literature in explicitly considering a model of strategic  
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alliance formation as the development of a portfolio of jointly held alliance resources 
that are linked to the resource portfolios of the individual alliance partners. The fourth 
section presents further extensions of RBT to examine the problems of ex ante and ex 
post division of alliance rents. One extension is the exploitation of the property rights 
theory of economic behavior (cf. Barzel, 1989) to explain how the economic rent 
streams from the resource portfolio should be shared among alliance partners, including 
participating financial institutions.  
 
A Brief Review of the Resource-based Theory of Strategy  
 
The central construct in the model is firm resources.
1 The bulk of the literature on RBT 
treats three categories of resources in the portfolio: physical capital, human capital, and 
organizational capital. The physical and human capital resources are the same assets 
that are the basis for traditional economic models. In addition, the portfolio of firm 
resources contains intellectual property including patents, specialized knowledge, 
information, and intangible assets like brand names. These resources clearly allow the 
firm to provide perceived product value to customers. There are other, less visible 
resources that provide value, much as Porter's secondary activities in the Value Chain 
(1985). These include decision-making processes, coordinating systems, human 
resources development (i.e. training), and the established patterns of work that 
organizational scientists call routines. The umbrella term for these resources is 
organizational capital (Tomer 1987).  The resources engendered in organizational 
capital represent the interpersonal relations that are directly and indirectly associated 
with the production and delivery of the firm's products and services. 
                                                        






The explicit inclusion of decision and control processes presents something of a 
challenge in analyzing a resource portfolio: where are the boundaries among human, 
physical and organizational capital? In traditional economic models, it wasn’t difficult to 
separate assets into physical and human; it is hard to confuse a human and a machine. 
Or is it? Consider a shift from a production technology using lathes and lathe operators 
making machine parts to a technology with computer-aided flexible milling machines. 
The difficulty in separating machine productivity from human productivity in the former is 
ascribing some quality dimension to lathe operators. This could be done by using years 
of experience as a proxy for operator quality. But how much of the increased 
productivity from moving to the advanced technology arises from the complex 
machinery and software, from the programmer, and from the operator? How much of 
the competitive advantage from this technology adoption is a result of the asset 
purchase, the human capital of the operator and programmer, the training process that 
upgrades this human capital, the maintenance contract with the manufacturer of the 
milling machine, the flexible manufacturing processes (including design, switch-over, 
and materials management) that permit capture of the full value of the machine’s 
physical characteristics? 
 
In the food industries we are confronted with analogous Gordian knots of human, 
physical, and organizational capital. An example is a total quality management (TQM) 
system. If the implementation of TQM is successful, it requires an investment in human 
resources (hired or upgraded) at nearly all points in the production process, an 
investment in software (manuals, computer programs), and the development of 
decentralized decision processes, control processes, and new working relationships 
with input suppliers.  
 
Successful strategies are not often based simply on individual specialized assets, but 
on a multiplicity of specialized assets. Mahoney (1995) calls these co-specialized assets 




We include a fourth category of firm resources not considered by Barney and others: 
financial capital. That is, the portfolio of resources available to the firm to obtain and 
sustain competitive advantage includes those liquid assets that can be quickly 
transformed into physical and human capital. There are two reasons for including 
financial capital. First, financial capital has much to do with the formation of many types 
of strategic alliances (see Westgren 1994b) and with the motivation for corporate 
strategy choices such as acquisitions and leveraged buy-outs. In addition, we will 
consider the dynamics of strategy, wherein the liquidity of financial capital permits firms 
to alter strategies to sustain competitive advantage by absorbing new physical and 
human resources. This perspective follows from the literature on organizational slack 
(Bourgeois 1981, Singh 1986, Sharfman et al 1988). Bourgeois defines slack as 
 
"that cushion of actual and potential resources which allows an 
organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or 
to external pressures for change in policy as well as to initiate changes in 
strategy with respect to the external environment "(1981, p. 30). 
 
There are two types of slack: absorbed and potential. Absorbed slack resources are 
already in place: excess machine capacity, large R&D staffs, flexible manufacturing 
technologies. Potential slack resources are highly discretionary; they are typically cash 
and other highly liquid assets. Thus, financial resources are important in the dynamics 
of strategy change over time. They permit the fastest and most divergent changes from 
existing strategy. Other resources that exist as absorbed slack permit change, but 
constrain its speed, direction, and magnitude. 
 
The portfolio of resources employed in the firm defines the strategy chosen by the 
management. The strategy of the firm provides, at least in the short term, the  
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opportunity to earn above-normal returns in the market. 
2 Customers choose their 
preferred products and the differential that they pay to the firm for the perceived value 
represents returns above what would accrue to homogeneous products produced by 
firms that compete using the same strategies. 
 
 
Rents Paid to Resources and Their Durability 
 
These market returns are effectively payments to the resources used in the production 
of the products; i.e. economic rents. There are four types of rent to be considered (cf. 
Mahoney, 1995). First, some resources earn Ricardian rents due to locational 
advantages or unique property rights to land, mineral deposits, or other physical 
resources. One interesting Ricardian rent in agriculture might be the locational 
advantage to producing where environmental regulations are lax or where right-to-farm 
legislation doesn’t preclude corporate enterprises. Second, there may be quasi-rents 
that accrue to firm-specific uses of certain physical, human, or organizational resources. 
Quasi-rents are the appropriable difference between the value of a resource in firm-
specific use and its second-best use by other firms in the economy. Third, there may be 
quasi-rents that arise from co-specialized assets; that is, the combination of various 
resources may be unique even though the individual resources have little or no inherent 
individual quasi-rents.  This is an interesting empirical issue. Does Tyson Foods earn 
supernormal profits because of a particular resource in the portfolio (e.g. management 
control processes or brand name) or because of the unique portfolio of relatively 
common production facilities, production contracts, location, and genetic stock 
combined in a complex manner within a matrix of corporate culture, management 
control processes, and other intangibles? The fourth genre of rents to be considered is 
                                                        
2 Above-normal returns are defined as compared to the perfect competition model of 
identical firms producing identical products with identical technologies. In the reality of segmented 
markets, heterogeneous products, and unequal resource portfolios among firms, all market participants 




entrepreneurial rents which accrue to risk taking, deft navigation through the "gale of 
creative destruction", innovation, and chance. My taxonomy of these rents reflects the 
writings of economists who are associated with them: 
 
a) Knightian  rents  – chance and risk-taking, 
b) Schumpeterian  rents  – innovation, and 
c) Kirznerian  rents  – alertness to market imperfections. 
 
It is important to note that there may be more than one entrepreneur in any organization 
or alliance who generates these rents. Kirzner’s entrepreneur is the agent in the 
Austrian economics tradition that finds profit opportunities for arbitraging resource 
values that are overlooked by others (Kirzner 1979, 1992) This entrepreneur may not 
have the technical capability for effecting innovation in products and processes, the 
Schumpeterian progress that generates short- or medium-term economic rents. Both of 
these rents arise from “first-mover” behavior relative to the ignorance, inertia, or asset 
fixity of competitors. Finally, there may need to be a party who earns rents from the 
ability to absorb risk, perhaps a venture capitalist. This Knightian entrepreneur seeks 
reward for chance-taking, often in concert with one or both of the other types of 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Entrepreneurial rents are only defined in a dynamic market system, but the resource-
based model of strategy celebrates the fact that all types of rents erode over time.  
 
The uniqueness of the portfolio of physical, human, organizational, and financial 
resources determines the size of these above-normal returns. Not all resources will give 
rise to these economic rents, especially those that are widely used by competitor firms, 
but some resources will effectively drive the stream of above-normal earnings by the 
total resource portfolio. Can these sources of earning-differentials be bid away by the 
market? Often, yes. The uniqueness can most easily be dissipated for physical and 
financial capital, and to a lesser degree, for human capital. The source of perceived  
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value is difficult to bid away if the resource that generates the rent stream is part of the 
organizational capital, which is less transparent to rivals seeking to emulate a 
successful strategy. Schumpeterian rents are eventually bid away by competitor 
reactions and are sustainable only to the extent that the first-mover continues to seek 
innovation or protects its innovation rents by "riding down" the experience curve ahead 
of rivals or uses some other non-static strategy. 
 
Barney (1991) shows that sustained competitive advantage (the ultimate goal of 
strategic management) requires that resources must be heterogeneous among firms 
and that there must be immobility of resources between firms. First-mover advantages 
are not sustainable if the relevant resources are available to all firms or are easily bid 
away from the first-mover. Barney writes that this is the significant omission of the value 
chain analysis, which is based on Porter’s adaptation of industrial organization 
economics: it ignores the necessity for heterogeneous resources in the development of 
sustainable competitive advantage based on configuration of the value chain. New 
production techniques offer short-term first-mover advantages (Schumpeterian profits) 
to adopters, but the rapid diffusion of this technology (the resource) results in a 
dissipation of competitive advantage. One observes this phenomenon in the food 
processing industries. Advances in quality management, such as using Total Quality 
Management programs (TQM), Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point systems 
(HACCP), or achieving certification for ISO 9000 have provided first-mover advantages 




What sustains competitive advantage? Barney (1997) shows that there are four 
characteristics of resources that lead to sustained streams of above-normal returns. 
 
1.  The resource must be valuable; that is, it makes a positive contribution to 
exploiting a position in the market.  
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2.  The resource must be rare; it cannot be widely available to competitors. 
3.  The resource must be inimitable (or imperfectly imitable) by competitors. 
4.  There cannot be substitutes easily available for the resource. 
 
Inimitability is a key characteristic of the resources that drive rent-earning. A resource 
cannot be easily or perfectly replicated by a competitor if it arises from (1) the 
idiosyncratic history of the firm (path dependence), (2) socially complex phenomena 
within or between organizations, or (3) causal ambiguity in the strategy process. Path 
dependence relates to the historical development of a resource that cannot be imitated 
by rivals whose histories differ. For example, the corporate culture of a firm arises from 
the shared, learned behavior norms of the persons in the firm. The imbeddedness of the 
culture is not easily imitated by competitors who have not passed through the same 
growth states and celebrated the same milestones in cultural development. Socially 
complex phenomena are inimitable because they arise from personal interrelationships 
within and between organizations. An example is a situation of mutual trust that exists 
between a buyer and supplier in a vertical strategic alliance. The trust, built upon a 
complex social interaction among managers in two companies, allows for effective 
mutual decision-making and a long-term mutual recognition of joint strategies.  This 
mutuality will be imperfectly inimitable by rivals of both firms: one cannot easily replicate 
a trust relationship. Causal ambiguity means that there are certain cause-effect 
relationships between resources and sustained performance that are poorly understood, 
and hence, difficult to articulate or to imitate. It is unfortunately true that the bounded 
rationality of managers prevents them from fully understanding how quasi-rents arise 
from the resources in the firm. A firm may easily impute its competitive advantage to a 
newly adopted physical technology, when the true source of the quasi-rent stream is a 
training program for workers that leads to continuous quality improvement. Barney 
(1991) argues that poor understanding of causal relationships within a firm is a 
necessary condition for the inimitability of resources by rivals. Causal ambiguity within 
the firm is sufficient for it to protect the resource from imitation, but not necessary. The  
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firm may understand the causality internally, but be able to mask the causal 
relationships from its rivals. 
 
The resource-based model states that resources are the source of sustainable 
economic rents because of the complex, idiosyncratic way in which they are combined 
within a firm. This is especially true because organizational capital arises from social 
processes in the firm that are by nature peculiar, path-dependent, complex, and 
ambiguous. If one implants physical and human resources within such a complex matrix 
of organizational capital, the resulting combination (i.e. the strategy) will be difficult to 
imitate even if many of the individual resources are homogeneous and imitable among 
firms. This complex matrix also acts as a mobility barrier for resources, by masking their 
value (causal ambiguity) and by making the process of extrication messy. That is, it is 
hard to bid away a resource, such as a research scientist, from a rival firm and replicate 
the unique strategy of the rival firm. The scientist's subsequent research program may 
be bounded by contractual nondisclosure and by their separation from other human and 
organizational capital that supported their work in the rival firm. 
 
The most important point to make at this juncture is that the resource-based model 
requires a dynamic analysis. That is there is no static definition for competitive 
advantage. Ghemawat (1986) noted in an analysis of sustainable advantage that 
 
 "...competitive advantages are insecure, or contestable, because each can be 
duplicated. (E)xamples show that some success stories do revolve around 
contestable advantages: all of a company's competitors may be stupid some of 
the time. But can you count on your competitors to be stupid all of the time?" 
(1986, pp. 54). 
 
In essence, Ghemawat extols managers to assume that rivals can and will seek to 
duplicate the sources of competitive advantage, although there may be temporary 




The Resource-based Strategy Model Extended to Alliances 
 
An alliance is strategic if and only if there are joint resources held by two or more firms.  
The joint portfolio can consist of physical capital resources (i.e. specialized assets put in 
place because of a joint decision by the firms). It may also include human capital 
resources.  An R&D alliance is often built around the specialized human capital of a 
research organization, such as the scientist's biotechnology firm.  As well, the alliance 
may be based upon shared decision-making or the intangible assets of partner firms. 
 
Consider two firms in a vertical market channel:  U is the upstream firm and D is the 
downstream firm.  Prior to the formation of any alliance between them, they each hold a 







where   P = physical capital resources, 
H = human capital resources, 
F = financial capital resources, and 
O = organizational capital resources, 
 
all of which are subscripted for the upstream and downstream portfolios.  The 
superscript 0 denotes the period before an alliance is formed.  Financial capital is 
included as an explicit resource because this is important to the development of many 
types of alliance in the usual taxonomy (joint ventures, long-term contracts, etc), 
including those which are financed by third-party financial institutions. 
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During period 0, each of the portfolios earns some quasi-rents: 
 
R(U
0 ) and R(D
0). 
 
Consider a simple strategic alliance, where U and D have a joint strategy that is based 
on making  decisions together in a long-term supplier-buyer arrangement.  The 
arrangement may comprise optimal scheduling of deliveries for the downstream firm 
and the commitment to make the upstream firm a sole supplier.  The joint resource 








Figure 1. A simple alliance 
 
J
1 denotes the joint (alliance) relationship and Oj is the organizational resources 
"donated" to the alliance by the partner firms. After the organizational resources are 





Let us conceive of a more complex alliance: an R&D venture where the upstream 
research firm donates human capital (i.e. scientists and technicians) and organizational 
capital in the form of joint planning and product development, and the downstream 
marketing firm donates financial capital to purchase specialized assets for the venture 





{} D            O , F , H , P     =   D
                   
  O                =   J
                   







































Figure 2. An R&D alliance 
 
The changes to the portfolios from U0 to U1  and D0  to D1 are more significant than in 
the supplier-buyer example above.  This type of alliance representation can include 
many permutations.  As a third example, consider a joint venture between a food 
manufacturing firm operating in the U.S. and a distribution firm in Mexico.  Both firms 
donate financial capital from their portfolios in period 0 to buy the resources necessary 
to found and operate a marketing venture in Mexico following the signature of NAFTA.  
The joint venture operates as a separate organization and the only tie to the two parent 
firms is the repatriation of income (quasi-rents from the joint portfolio).   
 
Figure 3. An equity joint venture
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Why do two firms agree to enter into a strategic alliance?  The decision rule is 
actually quite simple.  Define R(J
1) as the rent stream that accrues to the alliance 
DIWHU LW LV IRUPHG DQG &
u DQG &
d are the shares of the alliance rents that revert to 
the upstream and downstream firms, respectively.  The strategic alliance will 
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That is, the rent streams for both firms in period 1 that arise from their new 
portfolios plus their share of the alliance rent streams must be at least as great 
as their rents from their pre-alliance portfolios.
3 The logic of alliance dissolution 
follows from this. Often one partner will determine that the purchase of the 
tangible and some intangible resources of the alliance will result in an 
advantageous portfolio. As an example, many joint ventures are dissolved 
because one partner wishes to have the sole rights to the rent stream from the 
joint assets and they bid for the right to absorb the physical assets, management 
learning, market presence (reputation, brand name, distribution rights), and other 
resources into their portfolio. 
 
This leads to one of the inescapable empirical questions in the design and study 
of agricultural alliances. What is the set of boundaries that is drawn around the 
joint resources of the alliance (J
1) and the individual resource portfolios held by 
the alliance partners (U
1 and D
1)? Can the alliance governance structure 
                                                        
3 To be precise, in economic terms, we would have to label the quasi-rents in period 1 as 
expected quasi-rents since they are ex ante. This will be ignored here for ease of exposition. We 




effectively segregate the rents that arise from jointly held assets from rents 
earned external to the alliance resources? This is the essence of the boundary-
of-the-firm problem when applied to alliances. The easiest course is to have the 
equity joint venture, wherein all joint assets exist in a (statutorily) separate entity. 
For “handshake” alliances, boundary problems may be severe, particularly in the 
case of business failure – of the alliance or one of its partners. 
 
There are three points to be made about this resource-based model of strategic 
alliances. 
 
1. If intra-organizational capital resources are more difficult than other 
types of resources to imitate because they arise from social processes in 
the firm that are by nature peculiar, path-dependent, complex, and 
ambiguous; then inter-organizational capital resources should be still more 
difficult to imitate because of the complexities associated with the 
interpersonal relationships that exist between firms. Consider the case of 
the long-term supply relationship discussed above. For that alliance to be 
imitated, a rival (upstream or downstream) firm must find its own alliance 
partner with a similar portfolio of physical and human capital resources 
and be willing and able to create the firm-to-firm business relations that 
created and sustain the strategy of the first alliance.  One can reasonably 
expect the path-dependent nature of the formation of the first alliance to 
be extremely difficult to replicate. 
 
2. This model can extend easily to complex strategic alliances between 
more than two firms.  At any vertical interface in the marketing channel, an 
alliance may form among three upstream firms and one downstream firm, 
for example.  There also need not be symmetry among the "donations" of 
resources from the three upstream firms.  The alliance can be formed by a 
wide variety of inter-firm resource transactions.  The logical extension of 
this in the agri-food sector is an alliance of many family farms and a single  
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processor.  Some farms may require financial contributions from the 
processor as "up-front" money for seasonal production.  Others may use 
specialized assets from the alliance (high-tech planting equipment for 
lettuce production, genetic stock in animal production).  Still others may 
maintain their original portfolio of physical, human, and financial  
capital resources and only participate in shared organizational 
capital, such as jointly-defined delivery schedules and production 
techniques. 
 
3. This model is easily extended to alliances at multiple interfaces along 
the marketing channel.  In the production of high-quality Label Rouge 
poultry in France, each alliance is formed among farmers, feed mills, 
hatcheries, and slaughter plants (Westgren 1999).  The more complex 
the alliance, the more difficult it is to imitate the strategy, and the 
more sustainable is the competitive advantage.  A well-designed multi-
party strategic alliance will generate higher rents which in turn will reduce 
the likelihood of defection from the alliance by one or more partners. 
 
 
The Agricultural Alliance: Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions 
 
One interesting characteristic of agricultural alliances is that they typically have a 
horizontal dimension, as well as a vertical dimension. That is, several agricultural 
producers will combine around common assets to attempt to mimic scale 
advantages of large organizations. As an example, consider a common alliance 
that exists in the swine industry. Six hog finishing operations jointly invest in a 
two-site farrowing and nursery complex that provides enough feeder pigs to 
satisfy their combined finishing capacity. The group defines a series of processes 
such as medicated early weaning, segregation by sex, and other health and 
feeding regimes that maximize the returns from  the jointly-held assets. In 
addition, they devise a schedule of feeder pig placements from the nursery that  
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permit all-in-all-out production in the finishing barns, so as to maximize returns 
from those assets, as well. Ideally, the physical resources (barns and equipment, 
swine genetics) and the human resources (managers and employees of 
farrowing and nursery units, managers and employees of finishing farms) are 
surrounded by the organizational capital (joint decisions, common production 
processes, optimized schedules, and joint scale) to earn superior rents. What are 
the sources of these rents? Are they Schumpeterian? Possibly, but only for early 
adopters in a given region. Continued Schumpeterian rents will require continued 
investment, probably in organizational slack resources, to permit subsequent 
innovation. The financial resources available to the joint portfolio are important. 
Are they from co-specialized assets? Most definitely. 
 
Does a finishing barn earn quasi-rents? No. This is a common asset in the 
industry and, as such, it does not fit Barney’s description of rent-earning 
resources. A similar argument follows for many of the physical resources held by 
the finisher-partners. What of the farrowing and nursery buildings? They may 
have been unique in 1993 in much of the Midwest, but the durability of that 
uniqueness is questionable. The swine genetics are less a source of rent for top 
producers as 10 years ago, although many small, traditional farrow-to-finish 
operations in the US do not use the best genetics available. It is clear from 
observing the performance of firms in the Midwest hog industry that genetics and 
new facilities lead to co-specialized quasi-rents when combined with all-in-all-out 
and early weaning processes, superior herd health systems, feed processing 
technology. Combined with the scale effects of an alliance, owners of these 
resources can mimic some of the rent-earning capacities of the mega-operations 
such as Carroll’s and Premium Standard Farms. 
 
A vertical dimension to the alliance may also exist. A feed company or swine 
genetics company may be an alliance partner; in fact, substantial impetus for 
alliance formation comes from input suppliers. Many such firms have managers 
(“godfathers”) dedicated to the task of enrolling producers.  Downstream from the  
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hog production, the alliance may be joined by a packing plant. It is easy to see 
why the vertical partners wish to join a hog production alliance: guaranteed 
privileged access to the producers as a market for production inputs or a source 
of quality-controlled slaughter hogs. But the decision rule stated above places an 
onus on the vertical partners to bring some valuable resources to the alliance, so 
as to enhance the rent streams of the producers in a horizontal alliance. 
Guaranteed market access and lower marketing costs will increase rents as 
transactions costs are diminished and optimized feeds and genetic stock will 
enhance grow-out performance in both average performance and in variation. In 
this hog example, one can observe the same motivations and performance 
criteria that drove the broiler industry to vertically integrate, with horizontal 
coordination at the grow-out level. 
 
How does a bank value this alliance when presented with a loan application for 
the farrowing and nursery facilities? Should the manager(s) of these jointly-
owned, but physically distinct facilities be paid a fixed wage for managing the 
resources under their control or should they participate with the finishers in any 
quasi-rents ? These are not independent questions.  The way that rents are 
shared among the parties to the alliance (especially given the risk associated 
with the rent streams over time) have an impact on the nature of the financing 
contract. Property rights theory may elucidate these issues. 
 
 
Property Rights to Rent Streams 
 
Barzel (1989) develops an economic model of property rights. Among the cases 
presented are two of interest to the development of the RBT model of alliances. 
One is the collaborative relation between owners of land and labor; the other is 
the equity firm. In the former case, Barzel establishes the efficacy of fixed-wage, 
fixed-rent, and share contracts under different production conditions. Most 
importantly, the resource (physical or human) that has the greatest impact on  
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performance should have control of the attributes of all the resources and be a 
residual claimant. Thus, in the horizontal swine alliance above, the manager of 
the joint assets (farrowing unit) is the source of greatest output variability: by 
adhering to optimal routines and controlling hired labor, more pigs are farrowed 
and saved per litter and there is less shock (low feed efficiency) after transfer 
from one site to another. If this manager is on a fixed wage contract, there will be 
no incentive to optimize the use of all the resources in the farrow-nursery 
operation. The manager should have a share (incentive) contract. Where the 
horizontal alliance doesn’t recognize this and treats the joint resources as a cost 
center with minimal transfer prices of nursery pigs to finishing operations, 
expected quasi-rents will be lower and variation will be higher than otherwise. It 
follows that the repayment of credit for the purchase of the joint assets will be 
harder to guarantee from the rent-earning power of the farrowing-nursery 
complex. 
 
Barzel also takes the argument of variability of performance to an interesting 
conclusion in the equity firm: “the function of ownership is indeed to assume 
responsibility for variability in order to increase joint income” (1989, p. 58). To 
paraphrase the logic in terms of alliances, contractual payments to a partner will 
part of the time exceed the value of the rents earned by the resources owned by 
that partner and other times be less than the rent stream. Some guarantees must 
exist within the alliance to finance the differences between rent streams and 
contractual payments and “equity capital is a factor specializing in guarantees... 
(t)he guaranteeing function, therefore, determines (at least in part) the optimal 
level of equity capital” (p. 60).  In the case of a horizontal-vertical alliance in 
agriculture, such as the example of the swine venture which is financed by a 
combination of debt and equity capital, one must recognize the obligations of the 
structure of the alliance to account for both the incentives for maximizing of joint 
rent streams and for guaranteeing contractual payments in light of the variability 




There has been some work by management scholars in addressing the process 
issues in the structure and ongoing governance of strategic alliances.  One 
promising framework has been proposed by Zajac and Olsen (1993).  They 
suggest that partners in an alliance do not attempt to minimize the transactions 
costs between them, but instead seek to maximize (joint) transaction value.  This 
thesis is consistent with the model in this paper, wherein the partners seek to 
increase the rents earned by their individual and joint resource portfolios.  The 
articulation of a joint maximand in an important part of any formal model that 
captures the essence of the resource-based alliance strategy. Equally important 
is the articulation of the property rights to the jointly maximized rents, given the 
existence of contractual obligations, residual claims, and intertemporal variation. 
 
Rents, Rights, and Risk 
 
Several papers have suggested that alliance formation is driven by the goal of 
managing risk (Knoeber and Thurman 1995, Sporleder 1995). Usually governed 
by contract payments to growers in a vertical alliance, they provide risk shifting of 
output price and, sometimes, input prices from the animal production (grow-out) 
units to an integrator. Some alliances mitigate production risks through 
systematic use of superior feeding and health regimes. All-in-all-out production is 
such a regime that permits superior sanitation and disease control. Many 
alliances are based on providing guaranteed market access with or without 
accompanying reduction of price risk. 
 
Casual empiricism shows that a multiplicity of contract-based and noncontract-
based alliances are forming in agriculture. Some are built around managing 
common production risk; others seek to protect a partner against the 
consequences of idiosyncratic risk (to use the nomenclature of Knoeber and 
Thurman). For others, such as Label Rouge alliances in France, the object is to 
avoid market and price risk by optimizing quality for a differentiated product and  
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to pay technical consultants to maintain process control at all points in the 
production-marketing chain (Westgren 1994). 
 
An informed model of alliance formation must be explicit in describing risk-
sharing as well as rent-sharing. An issue is how to translate price, market, and 
production risks that accrue to the ensemble of resources to variability in rent 
streams at the level of resources. That is, if RBT is defined by rent-generating 
individual assets and by co-specialized assets and if RBT recognizes that some 
resources dominate the portfolio’s ability to generate rents, do we allocate price 
risk proportionately among valuable resources based on rents earned or on asset 
value? Or, do we seek to define some resources that are associated with price 
risk and allocate risk in a nonproportional basis? 
 
One issue stands out in this regard. How are the shares of alliance rents (e.g. &
u 
DQG &
d  in the examples above) that are returned to alliance partners 
established? As noted above, the equity joint venture easily solves this; shares 
are computed proportionally to equity capital invested by each party. It doesn’t 
matter which resources are the source of the rent stream; they are effectively 
bounded by the JV. It doesn’t matter if some of the ex post rents arise from 
chance, the vagaries of the market, or entrepreneurial behavior. The rents are 
allocated in the same proportions are those that are established ex ante.   
 
On the face of it, it should be easy in alliances governed by contracts – one 
residual claimant and n-1 contractual claimants, as suggested by Barzel. The 
contractual payments are fixed ex ante by the contract(s) and the residual 
claimant benefits from any rents that are earned above contractual payments by 
his/her skilful management of resources under his/her residual control. Fair 
enough. But what happens when the contractual claimants feel that resources 
that they own, but are controlled by the actions of the residual claimant, generate 
rents that are not allocated by the contract terms? This is the essence of 
problems that have existed for generations in cooperatives where product  
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pooling is used and/or where multiple lines of business are pooled for the 
purposes of establishing residual claims (patronage refunds). 
 
This issue is confounded by the fact that the rent-earning resources in the 
alliance are not always the same resources donated by the alliance partners. 
Financial resources are translated into physical and human capital resources. 
Organizational capital changes over time with organizational learning. Scale 
resources are defined only jointly. 
 
Thus, the model must be explicit about how risks common to all resources and 
risks associated with individual resources will be guaranteed by the alliance 
structure. The model must separate rent steams that are unpredictable ex ante, 
e.g. Schumpeterian and Knightian rents, in a dynamic model and those rents that 
are Ricardian or Paretian and accrue to identified resources. To date, the 
literature is silent on these issues. 
 
There is a close parallel between the development of a resource-based model of 
strategic alliances for our purposes as researchers into marketing and 
agribusiness management and the development of sound, coherent 
organizational forms for alliances that are forming around us in the agri-food 
sector. At some level, we will be forced to build and test theory in the wake of 
business practice, by observing the experiments that are going on around us and 
using inductive methods in our research. On the other hand, we know enough 
about the resource-based theory of strategy and about property rights to go 
before groups of producers that are contemplating a marketing alliance and pose 
questions to guide their action. Where are the sources of competitive advantage 
that you are designing into the alliance? How durable is the advantage (i.e. how 
long are the projected rent streams insulated from competition)? How does your 
preferred governance structure (closed cooperative, contracts, LLC) allocate 
earnings among the alliance partners? If earnings (rents) are volatile, who bears 
the risk and are they capable of financing consecutive periods of contractual  
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payments in the face of low market returns? Will banks and other financing 
entities wish to secure the joint assets of the alliance with assets held in the 
individual resource portfolios of the partners? Are their alternatives to dissolution 
in the face of defection or dissension over rent-sharing? 
 
We are in the midst of a fascinating laboratory for learning about individual and 
collective behavior, and for building better theory about organizational form and 
function. It is incumbent upon us to adopt the models and methods suited to 
studying these experiments as they unfold. We cannot wait until the 
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